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Abstract
The prospects for modelling the evolution of communi-
cation are considered, including the problem of inten-
tional explanation, and the possibility of grounding sim-
ulation work in theoretical biology. The seminal work of
MacLennan and Burghardt [16] on the evolution of co-
operative communication is described, and their exper-
iment replicated. Our results were broadly similar, in
that evolved communication was observed, but speciﬁc
diﬀerences are discussed. MacLennan and Burghardt’s
work is extended and their methodology critiqued in de-
tail. Their experiment remains a useful demonstration,
but artefactual features make their results diﬃcult to in-
terpret. Furthermore, we argue that too many factors
are simultaneously investigated for any general princi-
ples to be extracted, and suggest an alternative program
of narrowly-focused simulations.
1 Modelling Communication
What has to be happening such that we would describe
two entities within a computer simulation as communi-
cating? Can communication behaviour evolve in simula-
tion? Do we learn anything about animal communication
or the development of language from such work? Mac-
Lennan and Burghardt [16, p. 186] conclude that “even
in [a] simple synthetic world, communication may evolve
that exhibits some of the richness of natural communi-
cation.” The intent of this paper is to investigate the
prospects for modelling communication through a criti-
cal replication of their research.
1.1 Deﬁnitions
Communication can be a slippery subject, partly due to
the enormous variety of signalling behaviours in nature.
Looking at intra-species communication alone we ﬁnd ag-
gregational signals, alarm signals, food signals, territorial
and aggressive signals, appeasement signals, courtship
and mating signals, and signalling between parents and
oﬀspring [14] — the list is not exhaustive. It can be dif-
ﬁcult to capture all this under one deﬁnition, or under
one explanatory story. Krebs and Dawkins [13] suggest
that communication arises because all animals need to
be good at predicting the behaviour of other animals
in their environment, and that such mind-reading abili-
ties can be exploited, through signalling, to manipulate
the behaviour of the receiver. That is, communication
evolves when it is beneﬁcial to have one’s behavioural in-
tentions predicted (or falsely predicted). Some authors
[7] have suggested that this places too much emphasis on
dishonest communication, and a typical deﬁnition from
the biology literature [14] is as follows:
...the transmission of a signal or signals be-
tween two or more organisms where selection
has favoured both the production and the re-
ception of the signal(s).
Note that the role of natural selection is central, and
assumed as a premise (see sections 1.4 and 2.1).
1.2 Intentionality
The diﬃculty of deﬁning communication leads us to the
problem of intentionality. In cases of communication
between animals or simulated animals, to what extent
should we talk about the sender and the receiver as ra-
tional, intentional agents? Intentional (and teleological)
explanations have always been risky practice in science.
However, even the most rigorous accounts of communi-
cation (e.g. Shannon and Weaver [21]) are suggestive of
intentionality in both senses: an agent who intends to
communicate something to another agent, via a signal
that means something. If we consider a phenomenon
such as predator alarm calls in vervet monkeys [20], we
are a long way from being able to explain this at the
level of neurology, and unimaginably far from being able
to explain it at the level of physics. However, we can
talk usefully about what a monkey intended to achieve
by calling, and what a particular call means — indeed,
Harr´ e [11] describes primatologists who eschew such in-
tentional language, in the name of objectivity, but end
up surreptitiously using it anyway.
Dennett [5] argues that we should not resist the temp-
tation to adopt “the intentional stance” towards complex
systems like vervet monkeys. He suggests that this is anexample of a more general strategy in science of “chang-
ing levels of explanation and description in order to gain
access to greater predictive power or generality” [5, p.
239], and compares it to the abstraction of the concept
of food in biology. The underlying details of physics,
chemistry or whatever are legitimately ignored because
they do not contribute to the usefulness of explanatory
accounts at the higher level.
So where do we draw the line? Can we ascribe inten-
tions and meaning to just anything? Dennett suggests
that there will be no clear division between cases where
the intentional stance is appropriate and cases where it
is not. As we move to less and less complex systems,
mechanistic accounts of their function will become pro-
gressively more plausible.
We are not making the bold claim that animals have
intentions. There is insuﬃcient evidence at this time
to support either that claim or its negation. What we
are saying is that the concept of communication is an
intentional-level concept, and that therefore any attempt
to investigate communication without using an inten-
tional framework will be incoherent.
1.3 Work in theoretical biology, ethol-
ogy, and behavioural ecology
There exists an extensive empirical and theoretical litera-
ture on animal communication. Empirical work tends to
describe a particular type of signalling within one species
or between two species (see e.g. [10, 13, 14] for reviews).
Some of the most promising theoretical approaches (e.g.
Maynard Smith [17]) involve positing a functional model
of a signalling system and investigating the conditions
under which that system would be evolutionarily sta-
ble. The argument is that we should only expect to ﬁnd
relatively stable systems in nature, and that if we are
confronted with a system that appears to be otherwise,
we should expect to ﬁnd stability under the surface.
An example of this sort of work is that of Zahavi
[25, 26], later validated mathematically by Grafen [7].
They argue that signalling in sexual selection will tend
to be honest, and the signals costly. Assume that males
signal their reproductive ﬁtness to females through some
phenotypic trait: whereas we might expect males to ex-
aggerate their quality, females will be selected on the ba-
sis of their ability to discriminate between high and low
quality males. The evolutionarily stable situation will be
one where a signal is expensive for the male to produce
(e.g. the peacock’s tail). Thus deceptive communication
becomes impossible: if the male can aﬀord to display
that signal, he really is of high quality. Through logical
and mathematical argument, Zahavi’s counter-intuitive
idea — that sexual selection can be selection for a hand-
icap — is established.
1.4 Grounding simulation
We concur with Miller [19] that such work in theoreti-
cal biology and related ﬁelds is the best starting point
for those who wish to model communication and other
biological phenomena in silico. While the simulation
of adaptive behaviour (SAB) and artiﬁcial life (AL) re-
search communities have had prima facie success at sim-
ulating evolution, or, if you prefer, generating real evo-
lution inside a computer, it is not yet clear that their
approach is a reliable route to general laws or princi-
ples concerning animal behaviour. Too often, SAB/AL
work falls into the trap of circularity: a simulation is
tailored to evolve a speciﬁc phenomenon, and that very
phenomenon is reported as an unexpected and interest-
ing result.
The notion that evolution is a kind of optimising or
satisﬁcing process is not really under debate (pace Gould
and Lewontin [6]), and SAB/AL work should not be in
the business of merely showing that evolution works. In
all but the most open-ended simulations, the optimising
principle is built in anyway: high scorers on a pre-given
ﬁtness function are more likely to reproduce. If SAB/AL
is to go forward as a method of scientiﬁc investigation,
“proof of concept” displays must give way to research
that looks for structures underlying the observed phe-
nomena. As Maynard Smith [18] says of the theoretical
biology literature, “in using optimisation, we are not try-
ing to conﬁrm (or refute) the hypothesis that animals al-
ways optimise; we are trying to understand the selective
forces that shaped their behaviour.”
There are some recent examples of SAB/AL work on
communication that start with a model or theory from
biology, perhaps expressed mathematically, then vali-
date and extend that model using iterative, computa-
tional techniques. For example, de Bourcier and Wheeler
[4] look at aggressive signalling and territoriality. They
state that their method of synthetic behavioural ecology
“is pitched at an intermediate level between, on the one
hand, abstract theories based on mathematical models
and, on the other hand, empirical observations in com-
plex environments” [4, p. 464].
The two seminal examples of attempts to evolve com-
munication, however, are Werner and Dyer [22] — who
simulated the evolution of a simple communication pro-
tocol that allowed immobile females to guide blind males
towards them for mating — and MacLennan and Burg-
hardt [16]. We feel that both of these papers are worthy
of careful reconsideration, but for reasons of space we
concentrate entirely on the latter.2 MacLennan and Burghardt’s
experiment
2.1 Justiﬁcation
MacLennan and Burghardt describe their method as syn-
thetic ethology, contrasting it explicitly with simulation.
They state that:
Our goal in these experiments was to design a
synthetic world that was as simple as possible
while still permitting communication to evolve.
[16, p. 165]
MacLennan and Burghardt repeatedly emphasise that
their “synthetic world” is not supposed to reﬂect any
real environment, nor are their simulated organisms like
any actual species. Inspired by the synthetic psychology
of Braitenberg [2], they hoped that, in comparison with
empirical ethology, their stripped-down approach would
be “more likely to suggest behavioral laws of great gen-
erality” [16, p. 163].
MacLennan and Burghardt were aware of the diﬃculty
of deﬁning communication, and of the problem of imput-
ing intentionality. They adopted Burghardt’s [3] deﬁni-
tion of communication, which “ﬁnessed the issue of in-
tent by the requirement that the behavior be likely to
inﬂuence the receiver in a way that beneﬁts, in a prob-
abilistic manner, the signaler or some group of which it
is a member” [16, p. 163].
They chose to investigate cooperative communication.
Possibly this choice was inﬂuenced by Burghardt’s deﬁ-
nition, in that cooperative communication generally ben-
eﬁts both the sender and the group to which it belongs.
They reasoned that for communication to be selected for,
some of the simulated organisms must have access to in-
formation that the others in the group did not — oth-
erwise communication would be unnecessary. The non-
shared information must also be of environmental signif-
icance; it must be worth talking about. In line with their
deﬁnition of communication, they designed the synthetic
world such that communicating this non-shared informa-
tion would tend to confer a selective advantage.
2.2 Method
MacLennan and Burghardt1 used populations of simu-
lated organisms that they refer to as “simorgs”. The
simorgs all have access to a shared global environment,
and each individual has access to a private local envi-
ronment. The global environment provides a medium
for communication, and the local environments are a
source of signiﬁcant information that the simorgs may
1MacLennan and Burghardt’s methodology is diﬃcult to de-
scribe brieﬂy, and the reader is referred to their work [16] and
MacLennan’s earlier article [15] for a complete account.
evolve to communicate about. Each of the environments
is as simple as possible, represented by a single variable
that can take on a ﬁnite number of values. It is em-
phasised that “there are no geometrical relations among
[the simorgs]...they are not in a rectangular grid, nor
are some closer than others” [16, p. 166].
MacLennan and Burghardt suggest, by way of analogy,
that the global environment can be thought of as the air,
capable of transmitting only one sound at a time, and the
local environments can be considered exclusive hunting
grounds, into which diﬀerent species of prey may wander.
In other words, states of the global environment have the
potential to be exploited as signals, and states of the local
environment are particular circumstances that it will pay
simorgs to signal about.
Simorgs have only two classes of behavioural choice
open to them: they can emit a signal (into the global
environment), or they can act in an attempt to respond
to the signal of another. The state of the global envi-
ronment can be changed by any of the simorgs if that
simorg emits a signal when its turn comes; the states
of the simorgs’ local environments are not under their
control, and are periodically reset to random states.
In the synthetic world, simorgs achieve ﬁtness by suc-
cessfully cooperating with another simorg. Speciﬁcally,
by responding to a signal with an action that matches the
local environment state of the signaller. When this oc-
curs, both the signaller and the respondent are rewarded
with a point of ﬁtness. Continuing their analogy, Mac-
Lennan and Burghardt suggest that this is to be regarded
as two hunters bringing down a prey animal that neither
could bag alone. Assuming that successful communica-
tion has taken place, note that the signal does not mean
“I’ve got some prey here”, but “I’ve got prey of type
λ here; would you mind helping out with action-λ?”
The state of another simorg’s local environment is not
directly knowable, and successful cooperation can only
come about through a lucky guess or the employment of
communication.
In order to implement their ideas in a computer pro-
gram, MacLennan and Burghardt had to make a number
of somewhat arbitrary practical decisions. Thus, time in
the synthetic world is discrete. Once each time step, the
simorgs respond (i.e., act or emit) in a ﬁxed order; eﬀec-
tively they are arranged in a ring. The program keeps
track of the “owner” of the symbol currently occupying
the global environment. It is possible, for example, for
one simorg to emit and then earn several ﬁtness points
consecutively as a series of other simorgs act in response
to the same persistent signal.
Every ﬁve time steps (one environment cycle) the lo-
cal environments are reset to a random value, ensuring
that the simorgs must react to changing circumstances
if they are to succeed. Every ﬁfty time steps there is
a breeding cycle: two ﬁt simorgs are stochastically se-lected as parents and, using two-point crossover with a
small chance of mutation, a new simorg is generated. An
unﬁt simorg is stochastically selected to be replaced by
the child, keeping the population size constant. This ar-
rangement is akin to the steady-state variety of genetic
algorithms.
The experiments reported were run for 5000 breeding
cycles, populations were of size 100, there were eight lo-
cal environment states (L) and eight global environment
states (G) — “just enough possible sounds to describe
the possible situations” [16, p. 175] — and the mutation
rate was a 0.01 probability of one mutated allelle per
birth.
Finite state machines (FSMs) serve as the internal ar-
chitecture of the simorgs. MacLennan and Burghardt
could have used any number of architectures, and consid-
ered using neural networks, but settled on FSMs because
they “are both readily understood intuitively and easy to
represent in genetic strings for simulated evolution” [16,
p. 167]. In the experiment described2 the FSMs were of
only one state, which reduces to a look-up table. The
response a simorg would make at any one time step was
completely determined by the state of the global environ-
ment and the state of its local environment. The content
of each of the 64 (8×8) entries of the look-up table was
a ﬂag indicating act or emit, and an integer representing
the action-type or the emitted symbol respectively. The
genetic coding of the simorg was a direct mapping of this
structure.
MacLennan and Burghardt included in the program a
mechanism to (optionally) prevent communication from
occurring: the global environment could be overwrit-
ten with a random symbol after the response of each
simorg. They reasoned that if ﬁtness increased more
rapidly when communication was permitted, compared
with when it was blocked, then “true communication (in-
volving a sender)” [16, p. 172] was taking place. In a sim-
ilar fashion they were interested in exploring the eﬀect
of a simple learning rule, whereby a simorg that makes
an incorrect action (i.e. an action that does not corre-
spond to the local environment state of the last emitter)
in response to a signal has the appropriate entry in its
look-up table altered so that it would have given the cor-
rect response. Thus, they report the results of subjecting
the same randomly generated initial population to each
of the following experimental conditions:
C−L− communication blocked and learning disabled;
C+L− communication permitted and learning disabled;
C+L+ communication permitted and learning enabled.
2MacLennan and Burghardt actually conducted two experi-
ments; we focus entirely on the ﬁrst. Experiment 2 was an attempt
to evolve multiple-symbol communication and the results led them
to conclude that “making the step to multiple-symbol syntax is
evolutionarily hard” [16, p. 183].
In each of the conditions, they collected data on mean
ﬁtness over time. They also constructed a “denota-
tion matrix”, which recorded the number of successful
communication events, arranged in a table by local and
global environment states. They found that these matri-
ces were most useful when tallied over the last 50 breed-
ing cycles of a 5000-cycle experimental run. Under these
circumstances, the matrix was interpreted by MacLen-
nan and Burghardt as describing the evolved language
of the simorgs. The degree of structure present in the
matrix was indexed by co-eﬃcient of variation and en-
tropy statistics.
2.3 Results and conclusions
MacLennan and Burghardt report that communication
did indeed evolve in the synthetic world. The results
reported are for a single random initial population sub-
jected to each of the three conditions; MacLennan and
Burghardt assure us that these results are typical. In the
C−L− condition, there was only a very slight increase in
ﬁtness over the length of an experimental run, whereas
in the C+L− condition the rate of ﬁtness increase was
an order of magnitude greater. In the C+L+ condition,
the rate of ﬁtness increase was higher still. MacLennan
and Burghardt conclude that, when it is not suppressed,
communication is selected for and leads to higher levels
of cooperation. The provision of the single case learning
rule further increases the eﬀectiveness of the communica-
tive strategy.
Analyses of the denotation matrices showed that in the
C−L− condition, the pattern of symbol use was almost
random. When communication was permitted the ma-
trices were quite structured, as measured by the entropy
statistic. Visual inspection of the denotation matrices
made it clear that certain symbols had evolved to (almost
uniquely) represent certain local states. There was am-
biguity in two senses: sometimes a symbol would be used
to represent two or more states, and sometimes a state
was represented by two or more symbols. MacLennnan
and Burghardt suggest that the ambiguity is either due
to two subpopulations using diﬀerent symbol dialects, or
to individual simorgs using one symbol to represent two
diﬀerent states.
That there should be any ﬁtness increase at all in the
C−L− condition is not obvious. MacLennan and Burg-
hardt refer to this phenomenon as “partial cooperation
through co-adaptation”, and regard it as a “low-level ef-
fect” [16, p. 185]. They explain it by noting that simorgs
can do better than chance if they emit a symbol only in a
subset of their local situations, and guess actions within
that same subset (see section 4.4 for details).MacLennan & Our results
Burghardt Mean SD p
Fitness increase
C−L− 0.37 0.99 1.16 n.s.
C+L− 9.72 14.6 6.54 n.s.
C+L+ 37.1 10.6 10.6 0.025
Final mean ﬁtness
C−L− ≈ 6.6 6.74 0.43 n.s.
C+L− 10.28 12.71 2.68 n.s.
C+L+ 59.84 46.13 4.02 0.004
Table 1: Rate of ﬁtness increase (determined by linear re-
gression and measured in units ×10−4 breeding cycles)
and ﬁnal mean ﬁtness scores. Note that mean ﬁtness
data was a moving average smoothed over 50 breeding
cycles, and that ﬁnal mean ﬁtness in the C+L+ condi-
tion is much higher because the simorgs had four chances
per environment cycle to respond after correction by the
learning rule: ﬁtness scores in this condition start at 40+
rather than the usual chance level of 6.25. Rates of in-
crease are thus a better comparison across conditions.
3 Replication of MacLennan and
Burghardt
We replicated MacLennan and Burghardt’s experiment,
writing our own code3 based on the published descrip-
tions of their procedure [15, 16].
The replication gave qualitatively similar results, in
that ﬁtness improved over time when communication was
enabled, and structure developed in the denotation ma-
trices, but the speciﬁc results in the three conditions were
not reproduced. Table 1 contrasts MacLennan and Burg-
hardt’s results with our own; the rate of ﬁtness increase
per 104 breeding cycles and the mean ﬁnal ﬁtness are
shown. MacLennan and Burghardt’s results are taken
directly from [16], and refer to the single run they pre-
sented as the typical case. Our own results show the
mean and standard deviation across 20 runs with diﬀer-
ent random seed values. For each condition, the column
labelled “p” shows the statistical signiﬁcance of a two-
sample t-test of the null hypothesis that MacLennan and
Burghardt’s result could have come from the same dis-
tribution as our data (“n.s.” means not signiﬁcant, i.e.
p > 0.05).
The C−L− and C+L− conditions showed slightly
higher rates of ﬁtness increase in our own experiment.
More importantly, the rate of ﬁtness increase in the
C+L+ condition was more than three times smaller in
3Each author worked independently, to allow cross-checking.
Both authors used the C language; JN’s version was approx. 1500
lines long (including code for various statistics not mentioned here),
and DC’s version was 560 lines long. A 5000 cycle C+L− condition
ran in about 80 seconds on a Sun Sparc 20 (both versions). All
source code is available on request.
MacLennan & Our results
Burghardt Mean SD p
C−L− 5.66 4.96 0.15 < 0.001
C+L− 3.95 3.36 0.50 n.s.
C+L+ 3.47 4.45 0.36 0.015
Table 2: Entropy statistics, calculated on the denotation
matrix of the ﬁnal 50 breeding cycles of the experiment.
An entropy value of 6 would indicate a completely ran-
dom matrix. A value of 3 indicates a perfectly structured
matrix, with one symbol per situation.
our data than in MacLennan and Burghardt’s, and this
was statistically signiﬁcant. Our results do not support
their ﬁnding that the C+L+ condition, i.e. communi-
cation with learning, leads to the highest rate of ﬁtness
increase. We found communication with learning to be
inferior to communication alone.
Table 2 shows the entropy of the denotation matrices
over the last 50 breeding cycles of the experimental runs.
Again, MacLennan and Burghardt’s ﬁgures are taken di-
rectly from [16], and our own ﬁgures summarise 20 diﬀer-
ent runs. In the C−L− condition we found signiﬁcantly
more structure to the denotation matrices than did Mac-
Lennan and Burghardt, and in the C+L+ condition we
found signiﬁcantly less. Instead of the lowest entropy
being associated with C+L+, we ﬁnd it to be associ-
ated with C+L−. In other words, the most structured
communication conventions develop in the communica-
tion only condition, and the addition of the learning rule
only reduces that structure.
The diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and those of Mac-
Lennan and Burghardt should not be exaggerated. In all
measurements, across all conditions, our ﬁgure was well
within an order of magnitude of MacLennan and Burg-
hardt’s ﬁgure. Our interpretation of their experimental
method may not reﬂect exactly their actual procedure,
but at this point in time we have been unable to locate
the source of the discrepancy. MacLennan and Burg-
hardt’s central result was successfully replicated: that
communication, when enabled, leads to relatively high
rates of ﬁtness increase, and to the evolution of a struc-
tured “language” as evidenced by the denotation matrix.
4 Extension and critique
Having described the methods used by MacLennan and
Burghardt, and noted the degree to which our results
match theirs, we now wish to comment critically on cer-
tain aspects of their experiment. Several questions are
raised as to what might be an appropriate methodol-
ogy for studying the evolution of communication, and
we hope to answer these questions in section 5.Mean SD Eﬀect
Fitness increase
C−L− 0.94 1.52 −4.5%
C+L− 18.6 7.05 +27.4%
C+L+ 33.7 13.8 +218%
Final mean ﬁtness
C−L− 6.76 0.53 +0.23%
C+L− 14.47 2.83 +13.9%
C+L+ 22.24 5.21 −51.8%
Table 3: Eﬀect of random-order updating. Rate of ﬁt-
ness increase ×10−4 breeding cycles (determined by lin-
ear regression), and ﬁnal mean ﬁtness scores are shown,
with means and standard deviations across 20 runs. The
“eﬀect” column compares the random-order results with
our standard updating results (see table 1); note that if
the updating method was not inﬂuencing the results, we
would expect this value to be close to zero.
4.1 No geometry?
MacLennan and Burghardt claim that there are “no geo-
metrical relations” [16, p. 166] among the simorgs. This
is in keeping with their goal of constructing a synthetic
world that is as simple as possible while still permitting
communication to evolve. If the simorgs were arranged
on a toroidal grid and could communicate only locally,
for example, this would certainly complicate things.
However, in the current set-up, the simorgs are eﬀec-
tively arranged in a ring. As MacLennan and Burghardt
[16, p. 170] put it, “The simorgs react one at a time
in a ﬁxed order determined by their position in a ta-
ble.” Thus there is at least a topology, if not a geometry:
simorgs will tend to receive signals from their immedi-
ate neighbours in one direction, and send signals to their
neighbours in the other direction.
The experiment could have been performed without
this modest topological assumption if the simorgs were
updated in a diﬀerent random order at each time step.
We modiﬁed our version of the program to use just such
an updating procedure. Table 3 shows the rates of ﬁtness
increase and ﬁnal ﬁtness scores under this method.
There is a dramatic diﬀerence between the two updat-
ing methods. In the communication only (C+L−) and no
communication (C−L−) conditions, similar performance
is observed under both updating methods. The eﬀect of
the learning rule, on the other hand, depends very much
on the updating method used: under random-order up-
dating, the rate of ﬁtness increase is much higher. Cu-
riously, the rates of ﬁtness increase under random-order
updating come closer to the rates observed by MacLen-
nan and Burghardt — perhaps this is a clue as to the
cause of our diﬀering ﬁndings.
Furthermore, random-order updating clears up an irk-
some feature of MacLennan and Burghardt’s results. Fit-
ness in the learning condition commences close to the
random level of 6.25 (see the notes to table 1), which
makes mean ﬁtness directly comparable with the other
conditions — note the 51.8% drop in ﬁnal ﬁtness scores.
Under standard updating, a simorg will often have its
look-up table corrected on the ﬁrst time step of an envi-
ronment cycle, then ﬁnd itself in exactly the same con-
text on the next four time steps, and score up to four
“free hits”. When simorgs are responding in a diﬀerent
random order each time step, it is no longer the case
that a simorg will be communicating with the same near
neighbours every time, and the learning rule loses this
bonus property.
The most important point about the random updat-
ing procedure, however, is that it demonstrates that
MacLennan and Burghardt’s results could be dependent
upon such apparently minor assumptions built in to their
procedure. Their goal is to uncover general laws that can
be translated back into the realm of real biology, but if
the eﬀect of learning on the evolution of communication
is dependent on the updating method used, it is diﬃcult
to know what biological conclusions should be drawn.
Does learning facilitate the development of a commu-
nicative system, or doesn’t it?
4.2 Dialects or sub-optimal look-up ta-
bles?
MacLennan and Burghardt, noting the ambiguous sym-
bol use evident in the denotation matrices, comment that
“we cannot tell from [the denotation matrix] whether
this multiple use of symbols results from two subpopu-
lations or from individual simorgs using the symbol to
denote two situations.” [16, p. 179]. The idea that
there could be subpopulations using diﬀerent dialects
seems quite plausible, especially given that the topol-
ogy of the simorgs’ environment (see section 4.1) en-
sures that simorgs will only be communicating with near
neighbours. One can imagine a series of simorgs using
variant A in one section of the ring, shading gradually
into variant B in the opposite section, and back again.
MacLennan and Burghardt claim that the facts of the
matter could easily be uncovered: given that the underly-
ing ﬁnite state machines are available in computer mem-
ory, “there need be no mystery about how the simorgs
are communicating, because the process is completely
transparent.” [16, p. 179]. However, they make no clear
statement as to whether they in fact believe there are
two or more subpopulations using variants of the evolved
“language”. MacLennan, in his earlier paper, is less con-
servative: “the diﬀering use of symbols in various con-
texts makes it quite possible for every simorg to be using
a diﬀerent dialect of the ‘language’ manifest in the de-
notation matrix.” [15, p. 653].
In an attempt to resolve this question, we used a con-vergence statistic in our experiments. We examined each
position on the genome in turn, and calculated the mean
percentage of identical entries across the population of
simorgs. Thus, a convergence statistic of 100% would
indicate a population of simorgs with identical genomes
and, thus, identical FSMs.
In runs of 5000 breeding cycles duration, the ﬁnal con-
vergence statistic was typically between 75% and 85%.
This is not conclusive: it means that up to 25% of the
simorgs could have been diﬀerent from the norm, or that
25% of the genetic material of each simorg could be
unique, and so leaves plenty of room for the possibil-
ity of diﬀerent dialects. However, when the runs were
extended to 2 × 104 breeding cycles or more, ﬁnal con-
vergence statistics in the C+L− condition were approx-
imately 99.5%, and denotation matrices were qualita-
tively similar, i.e. they still showed ambiguous commu-
nication. It is implausible to suggest that there might be
diﬀerent dialects when the simorgs in a population are
99.5% identical to each other. We conclude that the sug-
gestive ambiguity in the denotation matrices is nothing
more than the net eﬀect of (more or less) the whole pop-
ulation using a single, ineﬃcient “language” that some-
times represents a state by more than one symbol, or
uses one symbol to denote more than one state.
Despite their stated wariness about adopting any sort
of intentional stance towards the simorgs [16, p. 163], we
believe that MacLennan and Burghardt are not immune
to the temptation to think of the simorgs as intentional
agents, and that, in this case, that temptation has led
them astray. Language without the scare quotes is un-
doubtedly the exclusive province of sophisticated inten-
tional agents (argued in e.g. [1, 5]), but having drawn
the analogy between human language and simorg com-
munication, MacLennan and Burghardt were too ready
to suspect that, like real language users, simorgs might
have dialects. We are not claiming that they were wrong
to draw the analogy in the ﬁrst place; indeed, a central
premise of adopting the intentional stance is to take such
analogies very seriously. However, in dealing with simple
systems like the simorgs, lower level mechanistic expla-
nations are potentially open to us. The intentional story
(dialects) can be shown, via the convergence statistic,
to be inferior to the mechanistic story (less than ideal
structure in the FSM look-up tables).
4.3 Consequences of the FSM look-up
table approach
Imagine for a moment that you are a simorg. Disre-
garding the fact that simorg “decisions” are entirely de-
termined by the look-up table, imagine that you have
decided to emit a symbol. The only context that is im-
portant to you is the state of your local environment: you
need to choose the right symbol to describe your situa-
tion, according to the “language” conventions that have
developed. The identity of the symbol in the global en-
vironment is unimportant, because you’re going to over-
write it anyway.
Similarly, if you’re going to act, you don’t care about
the state of your local environment; you only want to
interpret the global symbol in such a way as to correctly
match the environment of the last emitter, and thereby
score a point of ﬁtness.
For the real simorgs of MacLennan and Burghardt,
things are not this simple. There is no prior decision to
emit or to act, only the consultation of a table with an
entry for every possible combination of local and global
environment states. As MacLennan and Burghardt put
it, “ﬁnite-state machines have a rule for every possible
condition.” [16, p. 168].
Surprisingly, this means that the choice of the FSM
architecture makes evolving a communication system
harder for the simorgs than it might be under some other
control architectures. For example, if during a particular
run it became advantageous to reliably perform action-2
in response to symbol-7, FSM-controlled simorgs would
have to ensure — through evolution or learning — that
eight distinct entries in their look-up table came to be
identical. That is, they would need to perform action-2
in response to symbol-7 in the context of eight diﬀer-
ent possible local environment states. By contrast, a
simorg that was controlled by, for example, a classiﬁer
system (see e.g. [12, 24]) would need only to generate a
single production rule: “perform action-2 in response to
symbol-7”. We have not yet investigated this empirically,
but we oﬀer as a hypothesis our suspicion that simorgs
controlled by classiﬁer systems would evolve signiﬁcantly
faster than FSM-controlled simorgs.
MacLennan and Burghardt did not believe that FSMs
were the only architecture open to them, and adopted
them for pragmatic reasons. However, if an arbitrary
choice of control architecture is inﬂuencing their results
in unexpected ways, it is again diﬃcult to see how their
conclusions can be reliably translated back to biology.
4.4 Counter-intuitive optimal strategy
The optimal strategy for the simorgs, at least at the pop-
ulation level, must be to act as often as possible, and to
emit as infrequently as possible. This is because emitting
scores no ﬁtness points directly.
The best way for the simorgs to achieve this is to build
up a link between a single global symbol γ and a single
local state λ. A situation develops where simorgs always
“blindly” respond with action-λ, unless they are in state
λ themselves, in which case they emit γ. Imagine all the
simorgs acting in this way: it is clear that they would no
longer need to be concerned about the particular identity
of the symbol in the global environment. They would
know that it will always be a γ, and that it will always5 Communication reconsidered
MacLennan and Burghardt clearly succeed in establish-
ing that communication can occur in a particular sim-
ulated environment. They express the hope that their
work will suggest general laws or principles concerning
animal communication, but they are aware that “if the
synthetic world is too alien, we may doubt the appli-
cability to our world of any observations made of the
former.” [16, p. 166]. In section 4, we have pointed
out various ways in which their synthetic world is in-
deed alien. Regrettably, it is diﬃcult to see how certain
aspects of MacLennan and Burghardt’s results could be
translated into real-world biology. However, we are op-
timistic about the usefulness of evolutionary simulations
generally, and we would argue that the central problem
with their work is simply that it tries to do too much,
too soon.
There is not an established body of literature on simu-
lating the evolution of communication. As things stand,
communication is just one of the many biological phe-
nomena that have come under attention from those pur-
suing the SAB/AL programme. We think it is safe to say
that there are not yet any agreed-upon methods or land-
mark ﬁndings; there is only the central SAB/AL premise
that evolution can be captured in a computer program,
and a resolution to use ideas from biology, ethology, be-
havioural ecology, and signalling theory. In this context
we believe that, despite its apparently simple nature,
MacLennan and Burghardt’s work is overly complex and
ambitious.
MacLennan and Burghardt are trying to do a num-
ber of things at once. Primarily, they are attempting to
provide an existence proof for the synthetic evolution of
communication, and they make no secret of having con-
structed the synthetic world so that the simorgs will be
likely to reproduce only if they cooperate (i.e. commu-
nicate) in the speciﬁed way. They are also examining
a process by which arbitrary symbols can evolve to de-
note something in a simple “language”. As they put it,
“beyond merely detecting the presence of communica-
tion, we are also interested in studying its structure.”
[16, p. 173]. Further, because the simorgs must come
to know not only the correlations between symbols and
local states, but also when to act and when to emit,
MacLennan and Burghardt are eﬀectively looking at the
evolution of turn-taking. Finally, they are interested in
the eﬀect of learning on the evolution of communication.
With the possible exception of the basic existence
proof, each of these phenomena are poorly understood,
and each is worthy of a separate, narrowly-focused sim-
ulation experiment. When all of these questions of in-
terest are thrown in together, they interfere with each
other and make the extraction of general principles im-
possible. For instance, in trying to push the simulation
towards communication, they choose to reward both the
sender and the receiver of a message, and in an eﬀort to
leave things open-ended enough for spontaneous symbol-
meanings to develop, they use the FSM architecture. But
what is the relative importance of these factors in caus-
ing the observed results? MacLennan and Burghardt
allow spontaneous strategies for emitting vs. acting to
develop amongst the simorgs, presumably to leave them
as unconstrained as possible, but this decision creates
the loophole described in section 4.4. Would the same
type of communication develop if the simorgs were con-
strained to be senders and then receivers in turn?
In principle, it may be that communication between
simorgs is entirely dependent on their internal architec-
ture, or on the ﬁtness reward structure used, or some
other quirk of the methodology — MacLennan and Burg-
hardt themselves note that when the method for selecting
parents was deterministic rather than stochastic, com-
munication did not develop. It is not possible, from
MacLennan and Burghardt’s results alone, to determine
any necessary or suﬃcient conditions for the evolution
of communication; they are doing the equivalent of com-
mencing the study of gravitation with a four- or ﬁve-body
problem.
Of course, we are not claiming that if only the var-
ious factors bearing upon the behaviour of MacLennan
and Burghardt’s simorgs could be isolated, then the gen-
eral principles governing naturally evolved communica-
tion would be laid bare. It is quite likely that there are
complicated, non-linear interactions even in their small
system. However, if we do not understand the eﬀect
of each factor alone (e.g. cost or beneﬁt of communi-
cation, updating method, simorg architecture) then it
would seem optimistic to hope to understand the com-
plex case.
The diﬃculties with MacLennan and Burghardt’s ex-
periment can be seen in another light: they compare
synthetic ethology favourably with empirical ethology in
that experiments in the former are repeatable, and full
access to all variables is possible. However, this comes at
a price. MacLennan and Burghardt are forced to rigor-
ously specify the environment and the internal nature of
the simorgs, making several ad hoc decisions along the
way. In a sense, they have to go down to the level of
simorg genetics. This is interesting, because one of the
great strengths of ethology comes from what Grafen calls
the “phenotypic gambit” [8, p. 6], in which genetics is
almost entirely abstracted away, and broad behavioural
strategies are considered at a functional level 5. Most of
the time, the conclusions so derived are borne out in the
real world. The parallel to be drawn with MacLennan
and Burghardt’s experiment is that there is much to be
done, using simulation methods, that does not buy into
5Grafen was speciﬁcally discussing behavioural ecology, the oﬀ-
shoot of ethology that concentrates on Tinbergen’s third question:
“What is this behaviour for?”the question of internal architectures, but looks at one
phenotypic characteristic at a time and assesses its eﬀect
on the evolution of communication. For example, one
could simulate a population of agents who were either
communicators or mutes, and then allow that popula-
tion to evolve under diﬀerent cost and beneﬁt regimes
for communicative behaviour. We might expect that
when both the sending and the receiving agent bene-
ﬁt from communicative behaviour, then communicators
will come to dominate the population. But what about
when only the receiver beneﬁts, or when the sender’s
beneﬁt is relatively small? What happens when commu-
nicators will only signal to other communicators? This
sort of simulation, taking up where the mathematical ar-
guments of biologists such as Hamilton [9] and Grafen [7]
leave oﬀ, would give us a sound basis for further investi-
gations.
The best philosophical strategy for such future work
is to adopt the intentional stance with respect to simu-
lated organisms. Despite the fact that MacLennan and
Burghardt at one point go too far, in ascribing high-level
intentional phenomena such as language dialects to the
simorgs (see section 4.2), we agree with Dennett [5, p.
265] about intentional accounts: “...in a nutshell, they
work. Not always, but gratifyingly often.” We are also
conﬁdent that mechanistic explanations can peacefully
co-exist with intentional ones; in the very simple sim-
ulations we are initially proposing, no doubt mechanis-
tic accounts will predominate, with the balance grad-
ually shifting as real-world complexity is incrementally
approached.
MacLennan and Burghardt are at pains to avoid inten-
tional talk when they deﬁne communication, and Mac-
Lennan [15] criticises denotational (i.e. intentional) the-
ories of meaning. Nevertheless they rely on an analogy
featuring rational, intentional agents — the story of the
hunters — to make sense of their simulation, and they
use denotation matrices to index the meaning of sym-
bols: an intentional technique, in the sense of “about-
ness”, if ever there was one. We contend that to seek a
non-intentional account of communication is to seek an
oxymoron.
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